

# **Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? Nonverbal Communication in Parliamentary Oversight Committee Hearings**

by

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*“To me, public accountability is a moral corollary of central bank independence. In a democratic society, the central bank’s freedom to act implies an obligation to explain itself to the public. ... While central banks are not in the public relations business, public education ought to be part of their brief.”* (Alan Blinder, Princeton University professor and former vice chairman, Federal Reserve Board; (Blinder 1998: 69) )

*“We made clear as a committee that we were going to look at the distributional impact of the budget in unprecedented detail. As a result, George Osborne responded by giving a lot more detail not only in the budget but also when he came before us. And there were some pretty vigorous and detailed exchanges about the distributional impact of the budget in that hearing. I think everybody gained from that experience. It certainly enabled a wider public to find out exactly what was going on in the budget and the Government was forced to explain its actions.”* (Andrew Tyrie MP, Chairman Treasury Select Committee, commenting on Chancellor Osborne’s first budget (UK-Parliament 2011).

## **1. Introduction**

Public officials in modern democracies are conscious that their decisions and actions should be and are subject to scrutiny in the public domain. In the United Kingdom, this scrutiny is a statutory requirement and is conducted in formal parliamentary committee hearings. In economic policy, two very different sets of actors are routinely scrutinized by select committees: (1) officials of the Bank of England—who are not elected but appointed—are held accountable by committees in Parliament for their decisions in pursuit of their objectives towards monetary policy and financial stability; and (2) elected ministers from the UK Treasury are similarly held accountable for their objectives towards fiscal policy by these same parliamentary committees. The two quotes above—the first relating to monetary policy oversight and the second relating to fiscal policy oversight—highlight what might be considered the key priority for public accountability, namely the obligation to *provide explanations for objectives held and decisions taken*. In short, legislative hearings entail parliamentarians probing both central bankers and Treasury ministers; reasoned argument is therefore central to the purpose and focus of the hearings—that is, they are intended as a deliberative forum.

To be clear, “accountability” refers here to the requirement that policymakers are held to account for their decisions; they are obliged to explain and justify their decisions, *ex post facto*. This use of accountability presupposes a reciprocal dialogue, and crucially, necessitates a judgement on the effectiveness and persuasiveness of the policymaker who is being held to account (Bovens 2010: 951). Thus, the policymakers face questions and the parliamentary committees render judgments.<sup>1</sup>

Although deliberation is at the heart of decision making within public policy, its contribution remains inherently hard to measure and assess within a systematic framework. One approach to studying deliberation empirically is to apply textual analysis to the verbatim transcripts from committee meetings. In studying American monetary policy decision making, this methodology has proven valuable for gaining insights into both the policy meetings of the FOMC and the conduct of

oversight by congressional committees (Schonhardt-Bailey 2013 ). In a similar fashion for the UK, I have analysed transcripts of both the Treasury Select Committee and Lords Economic Affairs Committee hearings on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy (Schonhardt-Bailey 2015) over the period from 2010 to 2015 (i.e., the previous Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government). The findings from textual analysis are instructive as to the depth and breadth of arguments used by policymakers in their defence of policy actions; however, they provide no information as to the delivery of these arguments. That is, the written record provides us with the content of deliberation, but not the tone or the underlying inter-personal dynamic of the committee hearing. This project seeks to move beyond the content of deliberative oversight, in an attempt to gauge its delivery. More broadly, the goal is to bring research from psychology into textual analysis—that is, to fuse the analysis of non-verbal communication with the analysis of verbal communication (using text as data). As far as I know, none of the political scientists who use textual analysis have yet explored this possibility. Partly this may result because the task is too big (e.g., legislative debates, with hundreds of participants); the data under investigation appear only as text (e.g., tweets or press releases, although even here there is scope for gauging such things as ☺, !!, CAPS, and so on); or it may seem just too airy fairy for serious investigation. As for the latter, this may be true, but studies examining the amount of information communicated nonverbally (as a share of the total messages conveyed) estimate it as consisting of between 65% and 95% (Matsumoto, Frank et al. 2013: 12). To be sure, by studying text alone, we are missing quite a lot.

But, at the same time, not all settings are conducive to the expression of nonverbal communication. For the purposes of this project, the goal is to study where nonverbal messages influence—either consciously or not—the attitudes and behaviours of the audience, particularly in the form of persuasion. In legislative committee settings, where deliberation is the focus of the textual analysis (Schonhardt-Bailey 2013 ), nonverbal communication may be pivotal in the acceptance or rejection of arguments proffered by policymakers. Even so, nonverbal communication—or “body language”—is often viewed as vague and imprecise, so what is the case for taking it seriously?

## **2. What Are We Missing (by ignoring nonverbal communication)?**

Most of us are familiar with the term “body language” but more formally, nonverbal communication may be succinctly defined as *the exchange of messages in all forms excluding words*. As such, it may encompass a startlingly wide array of factors including gestures, vocal cues, interpersonal distance, attributes of the venue (indoors, outdoors; lighting; configuration of a meeting room), the appearance of speakers (clothing, make-up, jewellery, deodorant), and so on (Matsumoto, Frank et al. 2013: 4-6). Some of these are dynamic (gestures, touching, facial expressions), whereas others are static (physical environment, appearance of speakers).

Thus far, political scientists using textual analysis have focused on written (or spoken) data, and in most cases, this may well be enough. However, in parliamentary committee settings, where MPs and Lords seek answers and explanations from policymakers and ministers, and where these same policymakers and ministers seek to persuade the former of the merits of the decisions taken, nonverbal cues may serve to either enhance or detract from the persuasiveness of arguments. Broadly speaking, persuasion may be the product of (1) the content of the argument (e.g., is it difficult or easy to understand (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997)); (2) the way in which it is structured or framed ((Druckman 2001; Druckman 2004)); or possibly (3) the way in which it is delivered. It is in the delivery of an argument that nonverbal cues become potentially relevant. The question is, to what extent do nonverbal cues facilitate the persuasiveness of an argument or a person more generally, and how do these cues affect the deliberative process?

Within the broader literature on deliberation, the instinctual and emotive aspects of nonverbal communication are typically ignored in favour of the more rational, more *deliberative* aspects of communication. And yet, as Kahneman famously notes, psychologists have long noted two modes of thinking, one that is instinctual and “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control,” and one that is methodical and deliberative, thereby taking time, mental effort and concentration (Kahneman 2011: 20-21).<sup>2</sup> By focusing on nonverbal communication, we are allowing for the influence of “fast” thinking on our “slow” decision-making processes—particularly in the form of persuasion.

Beyond affecting the persuasiveness of speakers and their arguments, there are other reasons to anticipate nonverbal communication to be a fruitful avenue of research. One reason is that whereas speech is deliberate and sometimes scripted, nonverbal communication is far less conscious: “People are formally trained in their verbal behaviour in the schools. Nonverbal communication is less obvious, as in subtle facial expressions and barely perceptible changes in voice tone, and people are not typically formally trained in their nonverbal communication.” (Matsumoto, Frank et al. 2013: 8). Consequently, subtle facial expressions, gestures and so on may provide better insight into motivations, trustworthiness and credibility.

### **3. Nonverbal Communication: A Brief Overview**

Once investigation turns to nonverbal communication, the analytical and methodological framework immediately encounters significant hurdles, not least of which is the nature of the data to be obtained. Setting aside for the moment static forms of nonverbal communication—such as the committee room, seating arrangement, and so on—we can identify three primary forms of dynamic nonverbal communication: facial expressions, vocal cues, and body movement/gestures.

The study of facial expressions may be traced to Charles Darwin (Darwin 1872 (2009)), who first suggested that expressions were biologically innate and universal, as these had evolved over time and even across species (i.e., including both humans and nonhuman primates). But, Darwin's work on facial expressions and emotions was debunked until the mid-1960s, when studies documenting Darwin's thesis began to cumulate. The progression of these studies (and his contribution to them, which is undeniably central) is summarized by Ekman (Ekman 2004), but the bottom line is that seven emotions—anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise and contempt—have been found to be biologically innate. Moreover, each of these produces unique and identifiable facial expressions (Matsumoto and Hwang 2013: 16), as illustrated in Figure 1.

[Figure 1 – about here]

Following the earlier work of Darwin, the link between emotions and facial expressions is deemed to be “genetically encoded” whereby the core emotions are “associated with unique physiological signatures in both the central and autonomic nervous systems,” and are, moreover, “expressed universally in all humans via facial expressions regardless of race, culture, sex, ethnicity, or national origin” (Matsumoto and Hwang 2013: 25). Importantly, observers of facial expressions have demonstrated high rates of agreement on the underlying emotions, ranging from 60% to 95% (Frank, Maroulis et al. 2013: 62-63).

Turning to the voice, agreement rates for vocal expressions of the seven emotions are considerably lower than for facial expressions—i.e., ranging from “54% to 70% for judgments made within a given culture, to approximately 32% to 64% for judgments made across cultures” (Frank, Maroulis et al. 2013: 63). Characteristics of nonverbal vocal cues include the pitch, loudness, the quality or “timbre”, resonance, the rate of speech, the amount of time spent speaking, the response time (how long it takes person A to respond to person B), the time spent pausing between words, and errors in speech (Frank, Maroulis et al. 2013: 58-59). Such characteristics are relevant for parliamentary committee deliberations inasmuch as listeners remember better (and are more persuaded by) information if the pitch and amplitude are varied, and persuasion is further increased when the speaker pauses less frequently, spends less time in his or her responses, and speaks more quickly ((Frank, Maroulis et al. 2013: 67). As with facial expressions, the key finding for studies of the voice is that there appear to be universal expressions and interpretations of emotion, as articulated in vocal cues (Frank, Maroulis et al. 2013: 63).

Beyond facial expressions and voice, gestures and body movement comprise a third key mode of nonverbal communication. Two features of gestures are that they help to illustrate speech (e.g., pointing and saying “there”; nodding and saying “yes”) or serve as “emblems” in place of words (e.g., thumbs up for “okay”, shoulder shrugging for “I don't know/care”) (Matsumoto and Hwang 2013: 76-79). In contrast to the biological underpinnings for facial expressions and vocal cues, however,

emblematic gestures are culturally learned and are therefore less clear-cut to study and interpret. Nonetheless, the study of gestures in politics is increasingly capturing the attention of researchers across many disciplines, including history, philosophy and psycholinguistics (Manning 2007; Braddick 2009; Casasanto and Jasmin 2010).

But what clear evidence do we have that nonverbal communication in political settings actually persuades audiences? Most political scientists are familiar with the classic case of the 1960 presidential debate, in which radio and television audiences differed markedly in their assessment of whether Nixon or Kennedy won the debate (i.e., radio listeners were far more persuaded that Nixon won the debate, whereas television viewers were persuaded by the more telegenic Kennedy). Indeed, televised debates of national leaders are frequently used to examine the effects of nonverbal communication on political attitudes ((Maurer and Reinemann 2013; Bucy and Gong 2015). While the effects of visual cues by political leaders are noted in political election campaigns (Bucy and Grabe 2007), to date there has been little attention paid to the role of nonverbal communication in small group settings (some exceptions include (Dolgin 1983; Schubert 1983), and to my knowledge, no one has yet explored the role of nonverbal communication within the context of legislative hearings.

#### **4. How Do We Measure Nonverbal Communication in Legislative Committee Hearings?**

We do not lack established systems for coding nonverbal communication. Indeed, the initial problem is deciding which system, or which aspects of the various systems might be relevant to a real-world legislative committee setting. A related issue is that the data are comprised of archived videos, so that gauging nonverbal communication of both the sender and the receiver is limited by the available camera views.

To begin, one well-regarded coding system for facial expressions is FACS (Facial Action Coding System), which is based upon unique action units (AUs) of facial activity and categories of head and eye positions/movements (Rosenberg 1997). Intensity of facial expression is coded on a five-point scale, along with the timing of facial actions. This system has evolved into an industry on “micro and subtle expression training” which specializes in advising clients on how to “read” facial expressions in various settings. Led by Paul Ekman (the Ekman Group <http://www.paulekman.com/micro-expressions/>), clients include such names as Google, Disney, Apple, Pixar, Procter & Gamble, the CIA, the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (<https://www.paulekman.com/product-category/face-training/>).

Until quite recently, coding systems for body movement have been more dispersed across disciplines (for a summary and overview, see (Dael, Mortillaro et al. 2012)). Recent research has sought to compile a distinct and reliable coding scheme for body actions and postures, as exemplified by the BAP, or Body Action and Posture Coding Scheme (Dael, Mortillaro et al. 2012). In addition, research funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, based at the University of Duisburg-Essen, under the German Aerospace Center, has sought to employ animation technology (i.e., virtual characters, or avatars) to create “a new standard of excellence for computer-generated characters to be used within a web-based learning environment” ([https://www.uni-due.de/virtuelletutoren/index\\_en.shtml](https://www.uni-due.de/virtuelletutoren/index_en.shtml), and <https://www.uni-due.de/nonverbal-communication/>). Other recent coding schemes are not difficult to find—e.g., (Lhommet and Marsella 2015).

As noted earlier, the difficulty is not the lack of coding schemes, but rather in ascertaining the extent to which any of them (or parts of any of them) are applicable to a real-world setting, far removed from avatars and highly constrained by the amount of available information that might be gleaned from limited visual and audio data.

## **5. Nonverbal Communication in Parliamentary Committee Hearings: The Methodological Approach**

### *a. The context*

What is it that we hope to learn from observing nonverbal communication in parliamentary committee hearings? Questions of significance include:

- Are nonverbal messages evident and measurable?
- Are nonverbal messages a means by which witnesses before the committee seek to influence or persuade committee members, as they are held accountable for their policy decisions?
- To what extent are these messages acknowledged or reciprocated?
- Does nonverbal communication differ between types of hearings (e.g., on fiscal policy, where politicians are questioning ministers, versus monetary policy, where politicians are questioning non-elected experts)?
- Does nonverbal communication differ between MPs and Lords in their respective committee hearings?
- And, perhaps most importantly, to what extent can we gauge complementarities or conflicts between what is said (verbal communication) and what is expressed nonverbally?

Let us take one example, just to illustrate both the importance but also the challenge that underpins this task. In normal (non-crisis) times, parliamentary hearings on monetary policy do not obtain much media attention. However, in March 2014, one hearing raised the spectre of a possible major transformation in the conduct of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee meetings. During this hearing, Treasury Select Committee Chairman Andrew Tyre queried Paul Fisher (Executive Director for Markets and member of the MPC) on whether the Bank stored the verbatim transcripts of the MPC meetings, once these were summarized and published as minutes. The exchange became fodder for MPs and other Bank observers who have sought greater transparency from the Bank. As seen in the media attention given to this hearing (Figure 2), nonverbal communication plays a distinct role in capturing the underlying conflict between Parliament and the Bank of England, on the role for deliberation in policy making (see highlighted text).

[Figure 2 – about here]

From the archived video of this hearing, one could flag up even more instances of nonverbal communication, particularly by Governor Mark Carney, whose facial expressions and fidgeting clearly conveyed not only his amusement but arguably also his discomfort with the line of questioning.

#### *b. Coding*

The coding for the nonverbal behaviour in parliamentary oversight hearings on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy began first with a pilot study in summer 2014, in which my research assistant coded five hearings, as observed from the archived videos on the UK Parliament website (<http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/treasury-committee/>). The coding of these five hearings (from both fiscal policy and monetary policy, and from both the Commons' TSC and the Lords' EAC) was a "first cut". From this pilot, a simplified coding structure was devised, and implemented in summer 2015. Three research assistants (one senior and two junior)<sup>3</sup> independently used a coding scheme to systematically code specific nonverbal expressions and behaviour of key individuals for twelve hearings. These twelve are a representative sample of the total 37 hearings on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy in the TSC and EAC, over the 2010-15 Parliament, and are listed in **Appendix 1**. (The 37 hearings are analysed in their entirety, using automated textual analysis, and are reported in (Schonhardt-Bailey 2015).) Before beginning coding, the RAs underwent four training courses on micro expressions and subtle expressions<sup>4</sup> and were required to achieve a success rate of at least 75%. The RAs were also given a well-known textbook (Borg 2011) on "body language" to review and use as reference for the coding.

The coding proceeded as follows. For each hearing, each MP's or peer's "turn" in asking questions was treated as a "deliberative exchange" (DE). For the most part, this consisted of a back



and forth between one MP or peer and one witness, although it could include one or more witnesses. For each exchange, three basic dimensions were coded: facial expressions, vocal cues and gestures/posture. The template for the coding scheme is given in **Appendix 2**. Facial expressions such as anger, contempt, happiness, and so on were counted as single instances, and tallied for the whole of the deliberative exchange (which, typically, lasted several minutes for each exchange, as committee members took turns questioning the witness). Similarly, vocal cues, such as variations in volume, speed, and pauses in speaking were also tallied across each deliberative exchange; as were also gestures such as leaning forward, nodding or shaking the head. Clearly, the coders may disagree on some of the scores, but the idea is to come to a summary measure for the extent of non-verbal behaviour as a means of capturing the degree of non-verbal engagement for each deliberative exchange. The fundamental task was to capture the broad level of and variation in engagement.

The underlying premise is that neutrality in non-verbal behaviour connotes no engagement—that is, a neutral speech/statement resembles an almost robotic form of speaking. Any deviation from this signifies engagement of some sort. The basic premise that underpins the coding exercise is that greater use of nonverbal communication (facial, vocal and gestures) signifies engagement in the deliberative exchange, whereas less nonverbal communication signifies less engagement. That is, a more animated deliberative exchange—as measured by nonverbal cues—signifies more engagement. Broadly speaking, the greater the animation or intensity of the deliberative exchange, the more the participants are “paying attention” to the underlying substance of the discourse. Witnesses who employ nonverbal communication more frequently may be using these cues to better make their case—that is, to better persuade committee members. Of course, simple aggregate numbers of nonverbal cues are not sufficient to gauge the exchange—that is, the type of cues also matter. A relatively large number of contemptuous facial cues is likely to signify resistance to persuasion, whereas happy or surprise expressions may signify the opposite.

The discussion below presents findings from the coding exercise. However, before turning to these, I outline briefly the second stage of the nonverbal research design. This approach is experimental, and was just completed in December 2015, in the LSE Behavioural Research Lab. The experiment included 120 subjects (all students), with 20 participating in each of six sessions, with each session lasting 90 minutes. Subjects watched selected footage from the twelve parliamentary hearings previously coded in their entirety by the three RAs. Nine videos clips included three on fiscal policy, three on monetary policy/financial stability, and three from the Lords Economic Affairs Committee hearings. The clips focused on three witnesses: George Osborne, Mervyn King and Mark Carney. (**Appendix 3** provides further details on the videos.)

Using the Qualtrics survey software (<http://www.qualtrics.com/>), participants provided first some basic information on themselves (gender, age group, nationality, partisan orientation, etc), and

then, responded to a series of questions concerning their impressions of witnesses' persuasiveness, likeability, trustworthiness and lucidness. Video footage of hearings varies the setting by type of hearing (monetary policy, fiscal policy, financial stability) and by parliamentary committee (Treasury Select and Lords Economic Affairs). As a final part of the experiment, participants met in groups of five, in adjoining meeting rooms, to discuss their individual impressions. Each subject was asked to evaluate Osborne, King and Carney according to their (1) likeability; (2) competence; and (3) persuasiveness. Following these discussions, participants returned to their stations to reply once again to questions on their impressions of the hearing witnesses. This sought to gauge the extent to which participants were influenced to change their views, once they had a chance to discuss them with others.

The end product of the larger book project is to merge the results from an automated textual analysis of all 37 hearings with the results from the nonverbal project, and these will be complemented with more nuanced interpretations from elite interviews with MPs, peers, parliamentary staff, Treasury staff and Bank of England staff.

The results below report just one aspect of the findings—that is, the coding of the twelve hearings in their entirety—and as yet, these rely on the coding by the lead RA. Further work is needed to assess the reliability of these vis-à-vis those of the two more junior RAs.

## **6. Initial Findings: Nonverbal Communication in Parliamentary Committees**

### *a. The Context*

As noted earlier, the focus here is on the delivery, rather than the content of the discourse in the parliamentary hearings. Nonetheless, to understand the delivery some context is required. From an earlier analysis of the full verbatim transcripts of the 37 hearings on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy over the 2010-15 Parliament, variation in deliberation was found (1) between types of witnesses and types of economic policies; (2) between MPs and peers in their respective committees; and (3) of partisan influence across different policy areas (Schonhardt-Bailey 2015). (For reference, Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 from this earlier work are presented in the Appendix. These bar charts represent the thematic classification of the discourse for each set of hearings in the Commons Treasury Select Committee, and for the monetary policy hearings only for the Lords Economic Affairs Committee.)

First, it was found that oversight varies between (a) members of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee and Financial Policy Committee on monetary policy and financial stability, and (b) Treasury ministers—primarily Chancellor George Osborne, but also Danny Alexander, Chief Secretary to the Treasury<sup>5</sup>--on fiscal policy. The key difference is that hearings with BoE officials tend to exhibit greater reciprocity in deliberation, whereas those on fiscal policy exhibit

more of a “talking across” one another phenomenon. In monetary policy, both MPs and peers tend to converge with Monetary Policy Committee members on each theme: in these hearings, many members on both sides of the table acquire significance for multiple themes; individual members appear to be able and willing to speak to multiple themes. In fiscal policy, the chancellor tends to speak to one theme, whereas committee members focus on other themes, and individually, these committee members tend not to focus on more than one theme. Deliberation in financial stability hearings exhibits more of a committee-level reciprocity—that is, Financial Policy Committee members and MPs speak to the same set of themes, but there is more topic specialization than in monetary policy.

Second, deliberative reciprocity is evident for both sets of committee hearings on monetary policy; however, in the TSC, members tended to speak to multiple themes, whereas in the Lords’ committee, peers tended to focus on one theme.

Third, in the TSC, partisanship appears to vary across policy areas. In monetary policy hearings, there is virtually no cleavage between the two main parties, whereas in fiscal policy, MPs of the minority party (Labour) tend to have a greater say in questioning the Conservative chancellor. For financial stability, a small amount of partisanship could be discerned in the greater tendency of Labour members to speak to the housing issue.

*b. Results from Nonverbal Coding*

[Tables 1 through 4, about here]

Tables 1 through 4 provide the initial findings from the lead RA’s coding. Table 1 provides the aggregate means, as grouped by both policy area, chamber, and type of institutional witness (Bank or Treasury). The scores are presented for both the parliamentary committee members and the witness, and they aggregate across all the types of nonverbal communication (facial, vocal and gesture). Using the scores as a gauge for deliberative engagement, we find the largest scores for the hearings on fiscal policy (i.e., predominantly the chancellor from HMT before the committee). Not surprisingly, these are also the hearings most likely to expose political clashes on spending and taxing decisions. Financial stability hearings, by contrast, are the least animated. Bridging these findings with the content, we note that in fiscal policy hearings, not only do committee members and witnesses tend to “talk across” one another; they also become quite animated in doing so (perhaps in frustration with the lack of engaging in a more reciprocal dialogue). In financial stability, where witnesses in particular tend to specialize in areas of technical expertise, the deliberative exchange is far less animated and engaging between questioner and witness.

A second feature of Table 1 is the large variation cross-chamber. In the Lords' committee, parliamentarians tend to display few nonverbal cues (particularly relative to witnesses before the committee, whose mean scores are considerably higher: 8.78 versus 14.27), whereas in the Commons' committee, the nonverbal engagement is not only greater, but also more balanced between committee questioners and witnesses. Once again, married to the content analysis, whereas peers tend to topic specialize and MPs speak to several topics, it appears that topic specialization is associated with less engagement by Lords and more by MPs—as least, as gauged by nonverbal cues.

Turning to Table 2, we break the nonverbal coding into facial, vocal and gestures, and present the mean scores, again by the same groups as in Table 1. Beneath each category are the mean scores for each type of nonverbal cue. From these, we see a clear difference overall: for both the parliamentary committees and the witnesses (in the aggregate), gestures are used more than twice as frequently as facial cues, with vocal cues falling in between. By policy area, fiscal policy is again the most animated across virtually all the scores, and financial stability policy is the least. This may lend support for the contention that more politicized content, together with more of a tendency to “talk across” one another, creates more animated, more engaged deliberation (even though the engagement may not be reciprocal), whereas more technical content, with greater subject specialization by experts is associated with less animated, less engaged deliberation.

Across the chambers, the Lords are once again, less likely to use nonverbal cues, whether they be facial, vocal or gestures, while these are more frequently used by MPs.

Table 3 reports the mean scores for selected components of the facial panoply of scores, focusing on anger, disgust, contempt and happiness. Turning first to anger facial cues, the parliamentary committees display the highest anger in financial stability and fiscal policy; but interestingly, this anger is reciprocated far more by the witness in fiscal policy than in financial stability. With regards to both disgust and contempt, scores for fiscal policy by parliamentarians are three to four times greater than for either financial stability or monetary policy; but, there is a sharp contrast between disgust and contempt in whether or not the witness returns the disgust or contempt. Whereas the parliamentarians display frequent facial disgust, such disgust by Chancellor Osborne is far less frequent, by a magnitude of about 4 to 1. When it comes to contempt, however, Osborne displays far more nonverbal cues relative to parliamentarians (.76 to .47). And, by comparison, contempt scores for both monetary policy and financial stability (“All Bank”) are miniscule by comparison—for both parliamentarians and for witnesses. In sum, Osborne tends to display contempt and anger towards parliamentarians, whereas parliamentarians tend to express anger particularly towards Osborne and members of the FPC. This anger is mutual between parliamentarians and Osborne, but it is not reciprocated by members of the FPC.

Across the chambers, MPs display more than double the angry facial cues that peers do, and witnesses appearing before the Lords display more than double the happy facial cues than do witnesses appearing before the Commons committee. It may be that the topic specialization in the Lords creates a less confrontational (and perhaps less engaged) deliberation than in the Commons. Possibly also, lacking the specific departmental oversight remit of the Commons, the Lords may offer less overt challenge to witnesses than the Commons committee.

Table 4 measures the actual reciprocity in nonverbal cues in deliberative exchanges with just one parliamentarian and one witness, by calculating the pairwise correlations for each exchange (that is, the mean score per person, correlated with the mean score for the partner in the deliberative exchange). This measure reflects the degree to which a vocal cue by one individual in a deliberative exchange is matched by his or her partner in the exchange (regardless, of course, of who initiated the cue). From the overall means for facial, vocal and gesture cues, we see that vocal cues are most likely to be reciprocated—that is, the louder or more rapidly one member speaks, the more likely is his/her partner to match that volume or speed. Facial cues are the least likely nonverbal cue to be reciprocated.

Once again, clear differences appear between types of policies/witnesses. Across the nonverbal cues, Osborne and parliamentarians are most likely to reciprocate one another in both facial expressions and vocal cues (.77), with gestures trailing slightly behind (.70). Facial expressions between Monetary Policy Committee members and parliamentarians show the least correlation (.28), but the gestures between these two groups are more correlated (.60). The Financial Policy Committee members and parliamentarians exhibit high scores for both vocal and facial reciprocity, but it is important to bear in mind that their aggregate mean scores for nonverbal cues were about half those for fiscal policy (from Table 1).

Across the chambers, reciprocity is greatest for both vocal cues and gestures in the Commons relative to the Lords (.67 and .65; .56 and .33, respectively), but far more similar in terms of facial cues (.50 in the Commons and .58 in the Lords).

## **7. Discussion and Conclusion**

This paper is just the first step in exploring the persuasiveness of nonverbal cues in parliamentary oversight committees. The tasks ahead include: (1) checking for inter-coder reliability, by comparing these initial findings with the coding results of the two junior research assistants; (2) analysing the results of the laboratory experiments and merging them with the findings of the coding research; (3) integrating the overall findings from the nonverbal communication data with the results from the textual analysis of the transcripts; and (4) employing elite interviews to help interpret the data from the textual analysis and the nonverbal communication analysis.

Nonetheless, some initial results are intriguing. To provide an overview of those, let us return to our earlier set of research questions.

First, are nonverbal messages evident and measurable? Very simply, yes. A better assessment of the accuracy of the measures awaits further analysis of inter-coder reliability, but even the findings thus far demonstrate systematic evidence that nonverbal cues play a key part in legislative committee hearings.

Second, do nonverbal messages offer a means by which witnesses before the committee seek to influence or persuade committee members? Here the evidence suggests that witnesses certainly do employ nonverbal messages in making their arguments—perhaps most clearly in fiscal policy, where the deliberative exchanges are the most animated. But, the measures for anger and contempt by Osborne towards committee members show that the form of nonverbal cues is essential to understanding the effect—where anger and contempt are prevalent, persuasion on the substance of the argument may be a lost cause. But, overall, whether or not certain nonverbal cues actually serve to persuade committee members requires far more systematic evidence.

Third, are nonverbal cues reciprocated in committee hearings? Using pairwise correlations, we find that in the aggregate, witnesses and committee members tend to match one another most frequently in vocal cues and least frequently in terms of facial expressions. But, with regard to both facial and vocal cues, the chancellor and parliamentarians tend to match one another with high frequency. Reciprocity appears to vary across policy type and across chambers, but the substantive significance of this variation requires further investigation.

Fourth, does nonverbal communication differ between types of hearings (e.g., on fiscal policy, where politicians are questioning ministers, versus monetary policy, where politicians are questioning non-elected experts)? Again, quite simply—yes, and this is perhaps the clearest finding from the coding results. Fiscal policy is the most animated, most engaged policy area, and financial stability is the least animated. In fiscal policy, disgust and contempt facial cues are three to four times greater than for financial stability or monetary policy. The chancellor, moreover, tends to display contempt and anger towards parliamentarians, while they in turn tend to express anger towards both the chancellor and members of the FPC. Contempt and disgust by Bank of England officials (either in monetary policy or financial stability), by contrast, are nearly absent.

Fifth, does nonverbal communication differ between MPs and Lords in their respective committee hearings? Again, a clear yes. MPs employ all nonverbal cues (facial, vocal, gestures), more frequently than peers. Moreover, the use of nonverbal cues by committee members and witnesses is more balanced in the Commons than in the Lords; and, both vocal cues and gestures are reciprocated

more in the Commons than in the Lords. These findings suggest that MPs in committee hearings tend to be more animated during hearings than their counterparts in the Lords.

Our final question—to what extent can we gauge complementarities or conflicts between what is said (verbal communication) and what is expressed nonverbally?—is better left open-ended, pending further results and analysis.

**Figure 1: The 7 Biologically Innate Emotions, and Their Facial Expression**





## Figure 2: An Example of Nonverbal Communication in a Treasury Select Committee Hearing on Monetary Policy

### Bank of England Drops a Bombshell on Parliament: It Shredded Its Crisis Era Records

By Pam Martens: March 12, 2014

Mark Carney, the head of the Bank of England, and other officials from the BOE were put through a five hour marathon of questioning yesterday by Parliament's Treasury Select Committee covering everything from how long the BOE plans to continue Quantitative Easing (QE), to the potential for Scotland to vote for its independence, to what it knew and when it knew it about the rigging of the Foreign Exchange market by colluding global banks.



*Mark Carney, Head of the Bank of England, and Paul Fisher, Executive Director of Markets, During a Treasury Select Committee Grilling Over Destroying BOE Records*

The bombshell of the day, however, did not occur during the session on the Foreign Exchange scandal, which is stacking up to be a more serious matter than the rigging of the Libor interest rate benchmark which occurred under the nose of the Bank of England and the British Bankers Association. (London now seems to be in competition with itself for the prize of the century for overseeing the rigging of the greatest number of markets.)

The bombshell came in the following exchange between the Chair of the Treasury Select Committee, Andrew Tyrie, and a **very frightened appearing** Paul Fisher, the Executive Director of Markets at the BOE, who has served in that position since 2009. Apparently neither Parliament nor the public knew prior to this exchange that the records of the pre-crisis year of 2007, the financial collapse in 2008, and the monetary policy maneuvers in subsequent years to prevent another Great Depression had been destroyed in one of the world's most important financial centers; not to mention the fact that critical recordings potentially relevant to the Foreign Exchange probe are also gone.

Chairman Tyrie: "The MPC [Monetary Policy Committee] records might be of interest one day to historians about the inception of QE. MPC records used to be recorded and transcribed when the MPC was created. Is that still the case Mr. Fisher?"

Paul Fisher: "They are not transcribed. They are still recorded so that the secretariat can go back to check any discrepancies between the minutes and what people may have said. But as far as I know they are not transcribed."

Chairman Tyrie: "And they're stored?"

Paul Fisher: "The recordings are not kept. Once the minutes are published..."

Chairman Tyrie: **[In a booming, outraged voice]** "The recordings are destroyed! Why?"

Paul Fisher: "Because we have one copy of the minutes; that's the one that's published and there are not alternative versions."

Chairman Tyrie: "There are more than one purpose for these. There's the minutes after a fortnight and there's the historical value. The Fed Open Market Committee publishes full transcripts of its meetings with a five year delay. Whether it's a five or ten year delay, certainly these are of huge historical significance. Why aren't you putting something similar in place?"

Paul Fisher: "This goes back to when the Committee first started. They initially did try to make transcripts, unsuccessfully."

Chairman Tyrie: "What do you mean unsuccessfully?"

Paul Fisher: "It was very hard to actually physically transcribe the tapes in any way which made any sense in terms of the

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written material.”

Chairman Tyrie: “Is that because you’re shouting and throwing things about. Most organizations manage to transcribe a record. Even the House of Commons manages to do it on a good day.”

Paul Fisher: “I’m trying to explain what I know of it. My understanding is that people talking, very free flowing discussion, and they couldn’t make a sensible transcript.”

Tyrie strongly suggested to Carney and Fisher that the recordings should be preserved in the future and told Carney that he should chair the MPC in such a way that allows people to speak so that all can be heard.



*Andrew Tyrie, Chair of the Treasury Select Committee of Parliament in the U.K.*

Carney appeared to be attempting to suppress amusement during the exchange between Tyrie and Fisher and then breaking out in a full smile when Tyrie suggested the meetings of the MPC were something of a free-for-all. Carney’s amusement may stem from the fact he has been at the BOE for less than 10 months and can hardly be blamed for the long-term practice of destroying records.

Carney is a former Goldman Sachs banker who went on to become the head of the Bank of Canada, serving in that post during the financial crisis. He is the first non Briton to head the Bank of England in its more than 300-year history. That reality, and his non-British accent, seemed to invite an intensely interrogative style at times during the five hours of questioning yesterday by members of the Treasury Select Committee. Carney remained calm, courteous and professional throughout.

It’s clear to anyone paying attention that the BOE is attempting to clone itself into the Fed – as questionable as that idea might be given that the full transcripts that have been released by the Fed for the crisis years show it had blinders on in terms of the depth of the crisis.

Paul Fisher, as Executive Director of Markets, functions in a role similar to Simon Potter, Executive Vice President of Markets at the New York Fed. The Monetary Policy Committee or MPC at the Bank of England, is the clone of the Federal Open Market Committee or FOMC at the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. But the MPC only began operating in 1998, three-quarters of a century after [the FOMC held its first meeting in 1922](#).

Now Carney has announced that he is going to create what looks like a clone of the President of the New York Fed (William “Bill” Dudley) through a new Deputy Governor position at the BOE to oversee markets and banking.

Good luck with that. As Wall Street On Parade has [repeatedly chronicled](#), avoiding regulatory capture will likely prove as elusive at the BOE as it has at the New York Fed. And given the seismic nature of the market rigging that has gone on in London, this is like putting a Disney-themed band aide on a compound fracture.

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Bookmark the [permalink](#).

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<sup>1</sup> Notably, the concern here is with the explanations and justifications aspect of accountability, and as such, the focus is on the deliberative component of accountability, rather than the implications or consequences of any judgements (e.g., sanctions, penalties or other consequences of judgements are not explored in this project).

<sup>2</sup> My thanks to Christian List for this point.

<sup>3</sup> The coding scheme was first trialled with my RA of some fifteen years, who has extensive experience in managing quantitative and qualitative data. The other two RAs were second-year LSE Government undergraduates.

<sup>4</sup> These were from the previously discussed professional training by the Paul Ekman Group, and included: Ekman Micro Expression Training Tool 3.0, Ekman METT 3.0 Ekman Subtle Expression Training Tool 3.0, Ekman Micro Expression Training Tool Plus, Ekman Micro Expression Training Tool Profile (<http://www.paulekman.com/products/>).

<sup>5</sup> Other Treasury officials also attended these hearings and very occasionally, made interjections.

Table 1: Aggregate Scores for Nonverbal Communication (Including Facial, Vocal and Gestures)

<i>Group</i>	<i>Committee (Treasury Select / Economic Affairs) Mean Score</i>	<i>Witness (Bank / Her Majesty's Treasury, HMT) Mean Score</i>
All Financial Policy Committee	8.13	8.62
All Monetary Policy Committee	12.83	12.74
All Fiscal Policy (=All HMT)	14.33	17.35
All Lords Economic Affairs Committee	8.78	14.27
All Treasury Select Committee	13.3	13.45
All Bank of England	11.65	11.71
All HMT	14.33	17.35

Table 2: Mean Scores for Nonverbal Communication, by Type

<i>Group</i>	<i>Facial: Committee</i>	<i>Facial: Witness</i>	<i>Vocal: Committee</i>	<i>Vocal: Witness</i>	<i>Gesture: Committee</i>	<i>Gesture: Witness</i>
All Financial Policy Committee	2.12	1.45	2.81	2.51	3.21	4.66
All Monetary Policy Committee	2.21	2.04	4.74	4.07	5.88	6.63
All Fiscal Policy (=All HMT)	3.23	2.98	5.55	5.65	5.54	8.73
All Lords Economic Affairs Committee	2.24	3.10	3.08	4.33	3.46	6.84
All Treasury Select Committee	2.59	2.08	5.01	4.34	5.7	7.03
All Bank of England	2.18	1.89	4.25	3.68	5.21	6.14
All HMT	3.23	2.98	5.55	5.65	5.54	8.73
Mean	2.53	2.25	4.69	4.34	5.32	7.0
Median	2.6	2.4	4.17	4.18	5.85	7.2
Standard Deviation	1.13	1.02	2.25	1.71	2.28	2.51
Coefficient of Variance	0.45	0.45	0.48	0.39	0.43	0.36

Table 3: Mean Scores for Nonverbal Communication: Facial Scores, by Emotion

<i>Group</i>	<i>All Anger Scores: Committee</i>	<i>All Anger Scores: Witness</i>	<i>All Disgust Scores: Committee</i>	<i>All Disgust Scores: Witness</i>	<i>All Contempt Scores: Committee</i>	<i>All Contempt Scores: Witness</i>	<i>All Happy Scores: Committee</i>	<i>All Happy Scores: Witness</i>
All Financial Policy Committee	1.06	0.15	0.09	0.02	0.10	0.08	0.44	0.16
All Monetary Policy Committee	0.63	0.42	0.07	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.30	0.25
All Fiscal Policy (=All HMT)	0.97	0.78	0.32	0.09	0.47	0.76	0.14	0.32
All Lords Economic Affairs Committee	0.40	0.43	0.25	0.01	0.30	0.53	0.34	0.52
All Treasury Select Committee	0.90	0.51	0.14	0.04	0.22	0.29	0.26	0.20
All Bank of England	0.74	0.35	0.07	0.01	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.22
All HMT	0.97	0.78	0.32	0.09	0.47	0.76	0.14	0.32



Table 4: Pairwise Correlations: Summary Correlation Statistics for Deliberative Exchanges

<i>Group</i>	<i>Facial</i>	<i>Vocal</i>	<i>Gesture</i>
All Financial Policy Committee	0.70	0.78	0.51
All Monetary Policy Committee	0.28	0.55	0.60
All Fiscal Policy (=All HMT)	0.77	0.77	0.70
All Lords Economic Affairs Committee	0.58	0.56	0.33
All Treasury Select Committee	0.50	0.67	0.65
All Bank of England	0.39	0.61	0.58
All HMT	0.77	0.77	0.70
Mean	0.51	0.66	0.60
Median	0.54	0.68	0.58
Standard Deviation	0.34	0.23	0.19

# APPENDIX 1A

## LIST OF 37 HEARINGS OVER 2010-15 PARLIAMENT

*(12 SELECTED FOR CODING IN ITALICS)*

### House of Commons Treasury Select Committee

#### Monetary Policy Hearings

*28 July 2010, Inflation Report*

10 November 2010, Inflation Report

1 March 2011, Inflation Report

28 June 2011, Inflation Report

*25 October 2011 [Quantitative Easing]*

28 November 2011, Inflation Report

29 February 2012, Inflation Report

26 June 2012, Inflation Report

*27 November 2012, Inflation Report*

25 June 2013, Inflation Report

12 September 2013, Inflation Report

26 November 2013, Inflation Report

*24 June 2014, Inflation Report*

10 September 2014, Inflation Report

25 November 2014, Inflation Report

*24 February 2015, Inflation Report*

#### Fiscal Policy Hearings

*15 July 2010 [Budget]*

4 November 2010 [Spending Round]

29 March 2011 [Budget]

*27 March 2012 [Budget]*

26 March 2013 [Budget]

11 July 2013 [Spending Round]

*17 December 2014. Autumn Statement*

## **House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee**

### Monetary Policy

16 November 2010: Meeting with the Governor

*27 March 2012: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Governor and MPC members)*

17 December 2013: Meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England

10 March 2015: Meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England

### Fiscal Policy

30 November 2010: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Chancellor and Treasury Staff)

*8 December 2011: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Chancellor and Treasury Staff)*

4 February 2014: Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer

**Financial Stability Reports and Hearings 2011-2015 (All in TSC)**

*17 January 2012: (December 2011 FSR)*

17 July 2012: (June 2012 FSR)

15 January 2013: (November 2012 FSR)

2 July 2013: (June 2013 FSR)

15 January 2014: (November 2013 FSR)

15 July 2014: (June 2014 FSR)

*14 January 2015: (December 2014 FSR)*

## **APPENDIX 1B: PARTICIPANTS IN SELECTED HEARINGS**

### **MONETARY POLICY**

Treasury Select Committee, 28 July 2010 (Inflation Report)

*Members present:*

*Chairman: Andrew Tyrie (Conservative)*

*Michael Fallon (Conservative)*

*Mark Garnier (Conservative)*

*Andrea Leadsom (Conservative)*

*Jesse Norman (Conservative)*

*Brooks Newmark (Conservative)*

*David Rutley (Conservative)*

*David Ruffley (Conservative)*

*Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)*

*John Thurso (Liberal Democrat)*

*Andy Love (Labour)*

*John Mann (Labour)*

*Pat McFadden (Labour)*

*John Cryer (Labour)*

*Chuka Umunna (Labour)*

*Teresa Pearce (Labour)*

*George Mudie (Labour)*

*Witnesses*

Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England

Mr Charlie Bean, Deputy Governor

Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Markets

Mr David Miles and Mr Andrew Sentance, External Members of the Monetary Policy Committee

Treasury Select Committee, 25 October 2011 (Quantitative Easing)

*Members present:*

*Chairman:* Andrew Tyrie (*Conservative*)  
Michael Fallon (*Conservative*)  
Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)  
Andrea Leadsom (*Conservative*)  
Jesse Norman (*Conservative*)  
Stewart Hosie (*Scottish National Party*)  
John Thurso (*Liberal Democrat*)  
Andy Love (*Labour*)  
John Mann (*Labour*)  
David Ruffley (*Conservative*)  
George Mudie (*Labour*)

*Witnesses*

Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England  
Charles Bean, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy, Bank of England,  
gave evidence.

Treasury Select Committee, 27 November 2012 (Inflation Report)

*Members present:*

Mr Andrew Tyrie MP (*Conservative*) (Chairman)  
Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)  
Andrea Leadsom MP (*Conservative*)  
Mr Andy Love MP (*Labour*)  
Rt Hon Pat McFadden MP (*Labour*)  
Mr George Mudie MP (*Labour*)  
Jesse Norman MP (*Conservative*)  
Mr Brooks Newmark (*Conservative*)  
David Ruffley MP, (*Conservative*)  
John Thurso MP (*Liberal Democrat*)

*Witnesses*

Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England  
Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Markets, Bank of England  
Dr Martin Weale CBE, External Member of the Monetary Policy  
Committee  
Dr Ben Broadbent, External Member of the Monetary Policy  
Committee, gave evidence.

Treasury Select Committee: Bank of England May 2014 Inflation  
Report, Tuesday 24 June 2014

*Members present*

Andrew Tyrie (*Conservative*) (Chairman)  
Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)  
Steve Baker (*Conservative*)  
Stewart Hosie (*Scottish National Party*)  
Andy Love (*Labour*)  
John Mann (*Labour*)  
Mr Pat McFadden (*Labour*)  
Mr George Mudie (*Labour*)  
Mr Brooks Newmark (*Conservative*)  
Jesse Norman (*Conservative*)  
John Thurso (*Liberal Democrat*)  
David Ruffley (*Conservative*)  
Teresa Pearce (*Labour*)

*Witnesses*

Dr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  
Sir Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England  
Professor David Miles, Monetary Policy Committee Member  
Ian McCafferty, Monetary Policy Committee Member

Treasury Select Committee: Bank of England, February 2015  
Inflation Report, 24 February 2015

*Witnesses*

Dr Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England

Dr Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor, Monetary Policy Committee

Professor David Miles, External Monetary Policy Committee member

Dr Martin Weale, External Monetary Policy Committee member

*Members present*

Andrew Tyrie (*Conservative*) (Chairman)

Rushanara Ali (*Labour*)

Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)

Steve Baker (*Conservative*)

Stewart Hosie (*Scottish National Party*)

Mike Kane (*Labour*)

Andy Love (*Labour*)

John Mann (*Labour*)

Jesse Norman (*Conservative*)

David Ruffley (*Conservative*)

Alok Sharma (*Conservative*)

John Thurso (*Liberal Democrat*)



## BUDGET HEARINGS

House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: Budget: 15 July 2010

### *Witnesses*

Rt. Hon George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Sir Nicholas Macpherson, Permanent Secretary  
Mr Mark Bowman, Director, Budget and Tax, HM Treasury

### *Members present*

Mr Andrew Tyrie (*Conservative*) (Chair)  
Michael Fallon (*Conservative*)  
Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)  
Stewart Hosie (*Scottish National Party*)  
Andrew Love (*Labour*)  
Andrea Leadsom (*Conservative*)  
John Mann (*Labour*)  
Jesse Norman (*Conservative*)  
David Rutley (*Conservative*)  
John Thurso (*Liberal Democrat*)  
Mr Chuka Umunna (*Labour*)

House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: Budget: 27 March 2012

### *Witnesses:*

Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Sir Nicholas Macpherson KCB, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury  
James Bowler, Director, Strategy, Planning and Budget, HM Treasury

### *Members present:*

Mr Andrew Tyrie (*Conservative*) (Chair)  
Michael Fallon (*Conservative*)  
Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)  
Stewart Hosie (*Scottish National Party*)  
Mr Andrew Love (*Labour*)  
John Mann (*Labour*)  
Mr Pat McFadden (*Labour*)

Mr George Mudie (*Labour*)  
Teresa Pearce (*Labour*)  
Mr David Ruffley (*Conservative*)  
John Thurso (*Liberal Democrat*)

House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: Autumn Statement,  
17 December 2014

*Witnesses:*

Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM  
Treasury

James Bowler, Director, Strategy, Planning, and Budget, HM  
Treasury

*Members present:*

Mr Andrew Tyrie (*Conservative*) (Chair)  
Rushanara Ali (*Labour*)  
Steve Baker (*Conservative*)  
Mark Garnier (*Conservative*)  
Stewart Hosie (*Scottish National Party*)  
Mike Kane (*Labour*)  
Andrew Love (*Labour*)  
John Mann (*Labour*)  
Jesse Norman (*Conservative*)  
Alok Sharma (*Conservative*)  
Teresa Pearce (*Labour*)  
Mr David Ruffley (*Conservative*)  
John Thurso (*Liberal Democrat*)

## FINANCIAL STABILITY

December 2011 FSR (Oral evidence, 17 January 2012)

### *Members present*

Mr Andrew Tyrie MP (*Conservative, Chichester*) (Chairman)  
Michael Fallon MP (*Conservative, Sevenoaks*)  
Mark Garnier MP (*Conservative, Wyre Forest*)  
Stewart Hosie MP (*Scottish National Party, Dundee East*)  
Andrea Leadsom MP (*Conservative, South Northamptonshire*)  
Mr Andy Love MP (*Labour, Edmonton*)  
John Mann MP (*Labour, Bassetlaw*)  
Mr George Mudie MP (*Labour, Leeds East*)  
Mr Pat McFadden (*Labour, Wolverhampton South East*)  
Jesse Norman MP (*Conservative, Hereford and South Herefordshire*)  
Teresa Pearce MP (*Labour, Erith and Thamesmead*)  
David Ruffley MP, (*Conservative, Bury St Edmunds*)  
John Thurso MP (*Liberal Democrat, Caithness, Sutherland, and Easter Ross*)

### *Witnesses*

Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England  
Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability  
Michael Cohrs and Robert Jenkins, External members of the interim  
Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England

December 2014 FSR (Oral evidence, 14 January 2015)

### *Members present*

Mr Andrew Tyrie MP (*Conservative, Chichester*) (Chairman)  
Rushanara Ali MP (*Labour, Bethnal Green & Bow*)  
Steve Baker MP (*Conservative, Wycombe*)  
Mike Kane MP (*Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East*)  
Mr Andy Love MP (*Labour, Edmonton*)  
Jesse Norman MP (*Conservative, Hereford and South Herefordshire*)  
John Thurso MP (*Liberal Democrat, Caithness, Sutherland, and Easter Ross*)

*Witnesses*

Dr Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England

Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, Bank of  
England

Dame Clara Furse, External member, Financial Policy Committee

Martin Taylor, External Policy Member, Financial Policy Committee

## HOUSE OF LORDS ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 8 December 2011 (Economic Outlook)

*Chairman:* Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (*Conservative*)

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (*Conservative*)

Lord Lawson of Blaby (*Conservative*)

Lord Levene of Portsoken (*Crossbencher*)

Lord Lipsey (*Labour*)

Lord Smith of Clifton (*Liberal Democrat*)

Lord Tugendhat (*Conservative*)

The Rt. Hon George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer

Mark Bowman, Director for Strategy, Planning and Budget, Treasury

Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 27 March 2012 (Economic Outlook)

*Chairman:* Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (*Conservative*)

Lord Currie of Marylebone (*Crossbencher*)

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (*Conservative*)

Lord Hollick (*Labour*)

Lord Levene of Portsoken (*Crossbencher*)

Baroness Kingsmill (*Labour*)

Lord Lipsey (*Labour*)

Lord Moonie (*Labour*)

Lord Shipley (*Liberal Democrat*)

Lord Smith of Clifton (*Liberal Democrat*)

Lord Tugendhat (*Crossbencher*)

*Witnesses*

Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England

Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Markets, Bank of England

Dr Ben Broadbent, Monetary Policy Committee Member



## APPENDIX 2: CODING SCHEME

<b>QUESTIONER</b>		<b>WITNESS</b>		<b>WITNESS (2)</b>	
<b>FACIAL</b>	<i>score</i>	<b>FACIAL</b>	<i>score</i>	<b>FACIAL</b>	<i>score</i>
FEAR		FEAR		FEAR	
ANGER		ANGER		ANGER	
DISGUST		DISGUST		DISGUST	
CONTEMPT		CONTEMPT		CONTEMPT	
HAPPY		HAPPY		HAPPY	
SAD		SAD		SAD	
SURPRISE		SURPRISE		SURPRISE	
[OTHER EXPRESSION]		[OTHER EXPRESSION]		[OTHER EXPRESSION]	
EYE MOVEMENT (WINK, CLOSED EYES)		EYE MOVEMENT (WINK, CLOSED EYES)		EYE MOVEMENT (WINK, CLOSED EYES)	
TWITCH		TWITCH		TWITCH	
<b>SUMMARY SCORE-FACIAL</b>					
<b>VOCAL</b>		<b>VOCAL</b>		<b>VOCAL</b>	
VOLUME VARIATION		VOLUME VARIATION		VOLUME VARIATION	
ACCENT (E.G., NON-BRITISH)		ACCENT (E.G., NON-BRITISH)		ACCENT (E.G., NON-BRITISH)	
VOCAL RESPONSE (“UH HUH”)		VOCAL RESPONSE (“UH HUH”)		VOCAL RESPONSE (“UH HUH”)	
PAUSES		PAUSES		PAUSES	
STRESS ON WORDS		STRESS ON WORDS		STRESS ON WORDS	
SPEED VARIATION		SPEED VARIATION		SPEED VARIATION	
INTERRUPTIONS		INTERRUPTIONS		INTERRUPTIONS	
<b>SUMMARY SCORE – VOCAL</b>					
<b>GESTURES/ POSTURE</b>		<b>GESTURES/ POSTURE</b>		<b>GESTURES/ POSTURE</b>	
HEAD MOVEMENT (NOD, SHAKE)		HEAD MOVEMENT (NOD, SHAKE)		HEAD MOVEMENT (NOD, SHAKE)	
HANDS (WAVING, OPEN AND EXTENDED IN MOVEMENT, ETC)		HANDS (WAVING, OPEN AND EXTENDED IN MOVEMENT, ETC)		HANDS (WAVING, OPEN AND EXTENDED IN MOVEMENT, ETC)	
POSTURE (HIGHER SCORE FOR LEANING FORWARD, UPRIGHT AND ALERT)		POSTURE (HIGHER SCORE FOR LEANING FORWARD, UPRIGHT AND ALERT)		POSTURE (HIGHER SCORE FOR LEANING FORWARD, UPRIGHT AND ALERT)	
<b>SUMMARY SCORE – GESTURES</b>					

## APPENDIX 3

### Video Content for hearings

- **Treasury Select Committee Monetary Policy and Financial Policy Committee**

Jesse Norman & Mervyn King, 25 October 2011 [9:15-15:58]

George Mudie & Mervyn King, 27 November 2012 [56:24-59:35]

Andrew Tyrie & Mark Carney, 14 January 2015 [FPC] [10:04-17:36]

- **Lords Economic Affairs Committee**

Lord Lawson & George Osborne, 8 December 2011 [1:13:16-1:19:08]

Lord Hollick & Mervyn King, 27 March 2012 [18:12-23:05]

Lord MacGregor & Mervyn King, 27 March 2012 [0:30-6:15]

- **Treasury Fiscal Policy hearings**

Michael Fallon & George Osborne, 15 July 2010 [1:38:55-1:42:50]

John Mann & George Osborne, 27 March 2012 [49:15-54:56]

Andrew Tyrie & George Osborne, 17 December 2014 [2:45-4:55]

The criteria set including excerpts was as follows: we only used Labour & Conservative MPs, and also one Deliberative Exchange per hearing involving the Committee Chairmen. Only men were included, and the file content was intended to be broadly representative of the hearings in their totality over the Parliament with the samples representing the different levels of engagement apparent in the various exchanges.

Complete Running Time for Videos: 45 minutes, 25 seconds

Lords EAC, 16:29

TSC Fiscal: 11:27

TSC Monetary: 17:29


Sequence of hearings within files

1A	TSC Fiscal	TSC Monetary	Lords EAC
1B	TSC Monetary	Lords EAC	TSC Fiscal
2A	Lords EAC	TSC Fiscal	Monetary




2B	TSC Monetary	TSC Fiscal	Lords EAC
3A	TSC Fiscal	Lords EAC	TSC Monetary
3B	Lords EAC	TSC Monetary	TSC Fiscal
4A	TSC Fiscal	TSC Monetary	Lords EAC
4B	TSC Monetary	Lords EAC	TSC Fiscal
5A	Lords EAC	TSC Fiscal	TSC Monetary
5B	TSC Monetary	TSC Fiscal	Lords EAC
6A	TSC Monetary	Lords EAC	TSC Fiscal
6B	Lords EAC	TSC Fiscal	TSC Monetary


**Figure 5: Treasury Select Committee Hearings with MPC Members: Sum of Phi Coefficients**



**Figure 6: Treasury Select Committee Hearings with FPC Members: Sum of Phi Coefficients**



**Figure 7: Treasury Select Committee Hearings on Fiscal Policy: Sum of Phi Coefficients**



**Figure 8: Economic Affairs Committee Hearings with MPC Members: Sum of Phi Coefficients**

